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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
QUAYLE CANNON, JR., and SHELDON R.
BREWSTER, on behalf of themselves
and other parties similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No. 16586

-vsLEONARD W. McDONALD, in his original
capacity as Executive Director of the
Utah State Retirement Board, and
the Utah State Retirement Board,
Defendants and Appellants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
I

This is an action requiring defendant-appellants to grant a
legislative pension to plaintiffs-respondents.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment in favor of plaintiffs-respondents was granted by
the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondents, Quayle Cannon, Jr. and Sheldon R. Brewster, having
stipulated that they were (l) not in public service for 90 days during
the period July l, 1960 through June 30, 1961, and (2) did not, as a member
of the Utah Public Employees Retirement System, render public service covered
by the Retirement System during the period July l, 1961 through June 30,

1962, nevertheless claim that they are entitled to a legislative pension
for serving as legislators during the period 1941 through 1945, two sessions
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of two years each, and in the case of Mr. Brewster, 1937 through i 943
,
three sessions of two years each, and also 1937 through 1960, two Year
sessions.

The Respondents claim entitlement to a legislative pension

under the law therefore, simply because they are prior legislators, witr'·,
out reference to "service" or any other qualifying requirements. The
Retirement Board has denied the pension on the ground that the statutes
establish qualifying standards which these Respondents do not, by stipulation, meet.

The lower court found for the Respondents and

order~ 1 ~

payment of legislative pension to each.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENTS
WERE ENTITLED TO A LEGISLATIVE PENSION SOLELY BECAUSE
THEY HAD SERVED AS LEGISLATORS FOR FOUR (4) OR MORE
YEARS ... THUS MISCONSTRUING THE RELEVANT STATUTES.

The facts in the matter on appeal here are not in dispute.

A

stipulation (T-70) was entered into this record at the time set for trio
Thus, the issue is purely one of law and this Court has historically
reserved the right, as a matter of law, to substitute its own legal cone l us ion for those of the lower court without the general deference other·
wise granted to the fact finders.

It is respectfully submitted, that in

this case the lower court has erred and misapprehended the law, thus
placing in jeopardy the actuarial soundness of the whole Retirement Sy\\'
of the State of Utah, and each of the separate Funds administered by tn:
Appellants.

The plain meaning of the statutes is directly opposed to
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1

L

the judgment.

The sequence of events relative to the passage of

49-10-36 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, is important in clarifying the question here.

These facts are all a matter of public record of which this

Court may take judicial notice.
In 1961, the Utah State Legislature enacted the bill which,
with various amendments, constitutes the current Public Employees
Retirement System.

At that date, no particular legislative pension

system existed in Utah.

However, both the members of the legislature

and the Appellants interpreted the 1961 Act as including the members of
that body and withholding of contributions actually were made and paid
to the Retirement Board.

The salary paid the legislators was minimal,

the withholding minimal and the accruing pension benefit, thus minimal,
at best.

However, this 1961 Act established the basis for participation

in the retirement system by legislators and has never been either amended
or repealed, but indeed was carried over into the 1963 enactment of a
Establishing

bill which was then denominated in pertinent part as ".
a Supplementary Retirement Pension for Legislators; .
of Utah, 1963.

" HB 64, Laws

This bill did not purport to alter or amend in any way

the threshold or qualifying terms of the 1961 enactment, but on the
contrary, in Section 4 thereof provides:
"ADD I TI OMAL RETIREMENT BENEFIT"
"In addition to the retirement benefit provided by
Section 49-1-57 of the Utah Public Employees
Retirement Act, enacted by Chapter 100, Laws of
Utah 1961, a pension shall be paid to a retired
member who has credit for two or more years of
service in the Utah Legislature . . . "
(emphasis added)

-3-
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The 1963 Law was passed two years after the original pension law which
provided retirement benefits for legislators and other public employe

es,

and which established the threshold or qualifying standards for all
public employees--including legislators.

It is respectfully urged that

the emphasized language of the 1963 enactment is neither vague nor ambi~,,·
ous, but refers clearly to a legislator member of the retirement system
who has credit as established in 1961, two years previously.

It is sig-

nificant that all subsequent amendments to this Act required credit for
four (4) years of service as a member, but neither the 1965, the 19~,
1971, nor the latest, the 1975 amendment have changed the language of
qualification.

Therefore, the 1961 Act established the threshold or

qualifying standards for legislators.

The 1963 and all subsequent acts

merely created additional benefits without modifying standards.

Thosew.

had credit for the ( 2) years in 1963, following the 1961 enactment, had
four (4) years in all subsequent legislative sessions.
The pro vis i ans of the 1961 Public Employees Retirement Act,
dealing with eligibility, a threshold qualification of all public emplo)'f'
including legislators, gave credit for public service rendered prior to
July l, 1961 (the effective date of the Act) to all public employees and
elected and appointed offices who were (l) "employed" on July l, 1961~
(2) were employed in a covered unit between July l, 1961 and June 30, 1%
if they had been employed for a minimum of 90 days between July l, 1960
and June 30, 1961.
of Utah, 1961].

[Section 3 (5) and Section 18 (l) (2), Chapter 100, I·

The Respondent stipulated (T-70) that they did not havE

the credit specified above.
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Not only does the lower court's decision require pension payments to prior legislators who have made no contributions to the System,
nor otherwise qualified as we have urged above, but there appears to be
no rational basis for interpreting this decision as applying only to
legislators, since the initial qualification was identical for all public
employees, and, indeed, is the language used in all of the Retirement
Systems administered by the appellants.
through 20;

(Public Safety; 49-ll-17

Firemen; 49-6a-l0 through 12;

Judges, 49-7a-12 and 13).

Thus, all former employees or public servants, firemen, public safety
and Judges--without reference to "credit", appear to be entitled to a
pension if the respondents are--and on the same grounds.

It is obvious

that the systems were set up actuarily to avoid this result and cannot
remain solvent and actuarily sound if the basis of participation is thus
judicially undermined contrary to legislative intent.

Indeed, the retire-

ment of all members of the various systems is then placed in jeopardy.
"Credit for Prior Service" and "Current Service Credit,"
"member", "Credit" and "Service", together with other similar words and
phrases are special terms of art in retirement legislation.

All such

systems establish at the threshold, a point of entry or qualification
which is essential to the actuarial soundness of the system.

It is impera-

tive that the legislature be able to calculate within close tolerance, the
number of persons to be included, the source and amount of the contributions, the rate and conditions of pension payments, and the classes, if
it is so structured, in order to establish a viable and actuarily sound
public retirement system of any kind.

To have the terms used to accom-

plish this end judicially interpreted in the common usage, rather than
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in the intended terms of art is to fr us tra te the whole purpose and bankrupt the system.

In view of the points to be made herein, it is submitter

that the legislatures of this State have been fully conscious of their
intended usage, the interpretation placed thereon by the Appellants, and
have been satisfied with the results.

Thus, we respectfully submit that

the action of the lower court constitutes judicial legislation without
the concomitant ability to fund or balance the results.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THAT IT VIOLATED ALMOST
ALL ESTABLISHED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Respondents have sought to limit, or at least bottom their case
on the 1971 Amendment (T-2).

As heretofore noted, this is to ignore a

series of enactments beginning with that of 1961 and culminating in the

1975 or most recent legislation dealing with the matter at issue.

~.

ever, taking any particular amendment, such as the one of 1971, does not
materially alter the result where established rules of statutory construe·
tion are adhered to.

Each of these enactments use the terms of art here·

tofore alluded to--or some of them--in some form.

The 1971 legislation

is particularly instructive because it created for the first time a
Governor's pension, as well as the Legislator Pension created in 1963.
The distinction between subsections (1) and (2) of what is now, and
since 1967 has been 49-10-36 U.C.A. 1953, ~s amended, are striking. ~
statute reads:

(1) Upon reaching age 65 each former governor.of
the state of Utah shall be eligible, upon appl 1cation to the retirement administrator, to receive
for the remainder of his life a monthly pension of
$500 per month if he has served one term or $1 ,000
per month if he has served two or more terms as
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governor, provided that the payments under this
lifetime pension shall be suspended for any period
that a former governor holds an office of profit
or trust, paying more than $100 per month under
the government of the United States, state of Utah,
or any political subdivision of the state.
(2) Upon reaching age 65, and upon application, a
legislative pension shall be paid to a member who
has credit for four or more years of service as a
legislator in the Utah legislature, providing he is
not normally employed full-time in a position covered
by a Utah state administered retirement system. The
pension shall be $10 per month for each year of service
as a member of the legislature. If the retired member
is elected to another term in the legislature or continues to serve in the legislature after reaching age
65, his legislative allowance, as herein provided,
shall be suspended at the beginning of each session
under regulations as established by the retirement
board, but shall be restored at the same amount at
the end of the session. Memberts receiving an allowance and serving as legislators shall be eligible for
additional service credits and allowance adjustments
at the end of each two-year term of office, coinciding with the term of a representative, providing they
continue as contributing members during their service
as legislators.
General rules of statutory construction require the complete
reading of the statute and the
word and phrase.

givin~

of meaning, where possible, to each

(Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217,

Maurice Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 405 P.2d 1035.

It is for this

reason that we think the historical background of the current legislation
regarding legislators' pensions is important.

It is of help in under-

standing the present legislation and the me_aning intended in the usages
of words and phrases therein.

Further, it is to be presumed that the

legislature uses intended language, words and phrases, and is not redundant Metropolitan Water District v. Salt Lake City, 380 P.2d 721-Maurice Grant v. Utah State Land Board, op cit.
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In the drafting of the statute conferring a pension upon "eacr

former Governor" [49-10-36 (l), U.C.A. 1953, as amended], the le· 1
91 s atur
demonstrated it knew how to accomplish the objective of eliminating any
qualification except that of having occupied an office at some point in
time.

This statute is clear and unambi0uous and goes surely and directl

to the point.

Thus, when in subsection (2) of the cited statute, the

legislature retained the classical language of qualification common to

all public pension plans and used since 1961 and 1963 in the public pen-

sion plans of Utah, the rule of construction which requires that meanina
be given to

~

of the statute; the rule of construction that requires

the same meaning in a revised statute of words and phrases carried over
from the old (Security Life and Accident Co. v. Heckars, 495 P.2d 225);
and the rule against redundancy in statutory construction, demands a
different reading than that given to subsection (1), which the lowff
court failed to do.

A common sense reading of these two subsections

makes it clear that the legislature intended a different qualification
standard for former governors and for former legislators.

Read inlign:

of the legislative history of legislator pension plans in Utah, this
difference is marked and the intended standard clear.

The use of the

word "member" in the legislators provision [subsection (2)] can relate
only to the retirement system--not the legislature, since reference is
to both "member" and "serving as lec+islators" in the same sentence.
Further, the use of the word "credit" and "service" are redundant and
meaningless if the lower court's judgment is sustained.
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Thus, it is urged that the rules of statutory construction
heretofore established and adhered to by this Court were not applied to
this case by the lower court and reversible error resulted.
POINT III
THE LEGISLATURE HAS CLEAR AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH
INITIAL QUALIFICATION STANDARDS IN PENSION LEGISLATION AND IT HAS DONE SO IN THIS CASE.
In a Memorandum (T-43) filed by Respondents in support of their
judgment demand it is asserted that the legislature could not discriminate
between former legislators and those actually admitted to a pension under
the statute.

It is not clear that the lower court reached this question

in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law (T-55), but the decision
written by the Court was broad enough to do so, and we thus comment
briefly on this question.
This Court has heretofore spoken on the question of qualification and line drawing when, in Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement
System Board of Administration, 246 P.2d 591, it said:
"No matter where the line is drawn, whether it
be fifteen years, ten years, eight years, or
any other place, the classification will undoubtedly seem harsh and unreasonable to those
who have been excluded just below this line."
Thus, while it is not argued that the legislature could not have drafted
the law differently and applied it as it so clearly did in the governor's
pension provision, the legal power rests with the legislature to determine where it will draw the line and the courts should implement, not
impede the clear legislative mandate once it has exercised its prerogative.
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..
Further, in the recent case of Bryson, et al. v. Utah

s~~

Retirement Office, 573 P.2d 1280, this Court once again affirmed the
authority and propriety of the legislature in establishing standards
and making distinctions among the various systems.

Thus, the legisla-

tive mandate is clear and the courts ought not to interfere simply
because, were the option theirs, they would draw the line elsewhere.

~

view of the well-established law of this jurisdiction, the courts shoulo
not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature, particularly
in cases such as this where the funding and actuarial soundness of the
whole system which the legislature has carefully considered and balancer.
may thus be upset and destroyed.

If "credits", "service", and "member"

are so easily ignored and written out of the law by judicial fiat in
legislative pensions, how do we deal with the same pension terms of an
in all the other retirement systems?

This is particularly so because

the several l egi s la tu res never sought to alter or amend the qua l ificativ

1

for membership in the system established for all public employees in1% 1
POINT IV
THE DOCTRINES OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT.
\.le believe, as heretofore noted in this brief, that the langu•1

of the statutes is clear and unambiguous.

However, in view of the posit·

taken by the Respondents and the judgment of the lower court, we believe
the doctrines alluded to in this point must be given consideration. It
is well-established that "(w)hile construction of a statute by the admir··
istrative is not binding on the courts, ... if such construction is nor
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out of harmony with the apparent intent, the administrative interpretation
will be given some weight in applying the statutes to controversies that
arise thereunder."

(State of Utah v. James L. Hatch and Della L. Hatch,

342 P.2d, 1103, and case cited therein).

In the cited case, this Court

cites with approval a prior statement of the Court that the legislature
is presumed to know the construction placed upon the language of the
statutes by the administering agency, and continued inaction on the part
of the legislature to alter or amend it, constitute affirmative approval.
In this context, it is significant to observe that an attempt has been
made in three legislative sessions to amend the language of the statute
in question to accomplish the objective sought by the Respondents in this
litigation.

In 1975 a bill was prepared to provide a pension to "any

former member of the Utah Legi sl a tu re ... " (T-32).
and the bill was never introduced.

No sponsor was obtained

In 1977, Senate Bill 314 (T-34) was

sponsored by Warren E. Pugh and Ivan M. Matheson " ... clarifying the
Basis of Service of Legislators for their Retirement Pension."
died in the Senate Sifting Committee.

This Bill

A bill was introduced in the last

legislative session (1979) to accomplish the same objective and was not
passed.

(S.B. 83 which passed in the Senate and died in the House.)
In view of this record the Doctrine of Administrative Interpre-

tation, if it is to have more than lip service, must be given substantial
weight in favor of the Appellants in this case.

This becomes particularly

so when we consider it in the light of the Doctrine of Contemporaneous
Construction.
One of the Respondents herein filed a claim for a legislative
pension in or about 1972 or 1973.

Subsequent thereto, the then Executive
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Director of the Utah State Retirement Board, Leonard W. McDonald,

request:·

an opinion of Attorney General 's office on the validity of this claim.
Under date of April 6, 1973 a Formal Opinion (No. 73-007) of that offic,
was prepared by Roger K. Bean and submitted to Mr. McDonald.

Th at Opiniu· ·

1

(T-37) held that the claim was not payable under the then existing (and
now in pertinent part unamended) legislation.
In the case of State v. Alta Club, et al., 232 P.2d

759, this'

Court acknowledged and used the Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction.
The issue there was the legality of locker clubs under the existing law. i
After discovering a series of legislative investigation and attorney
general opinions--both written and apparently oral, over a period of
years, and dealing with an argument that the Doctrine of Contemporaneous
Construction did not apply because the statute was clear and unambiguous,
the Court said:
"It seems abundantly clear that the several
legislatures, to the attention of which this
locker system was called, did not remain
inactive because they believed such system
was clearly interdicted under the present law,
inasmuch as they were advised to the contrary
by the chief law enforcement officer of the
State."

I

Similarly, the several legislatures to which the administrative interpr:·)

i

tation and the Attorney General's Opinion were known in this case, did
not alter or amend the law.

Indeed, they affirmatively refused to do

so--although they were aware of the interpretation thereof by the chief:
law enforcement office of the State.
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the doctrines of
administration interpretation and contemporaneous construction strongly.
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I

militate against the judgment of the lower court and thus, reversible
error was committed which this Court should redress.
It should be noted that compliance with the judgment of the
lower court would not be in compliance with the law, in any event, since
the $10 per month for each year of service is not the present law.

We

allude to this because we think it illustrates that neither the
Respondents nor the lower court have understood retirement legislation
generally nor the legislative pension provisions specifically (T-61).
Further, we note that the lower court, after finding the action was not
certified as a class action and, therefore, is not deemed to be so, but
is limited to the two named plaintiffs (T-56), proceeds to conclude
(T-58) that "Each former Utah Legislator" is entitled to a

Pension,

and further declares in its judgment (T-61) that "every former Utah
Legislator" is so entitled.

CONCLUSION
It is urged that a common sense reading of the several statutes
involved in this litigation, when the proper rules of statutory construction are applied, and the established doctrines of administrative interpretation and contemporaneous construction are considered, leave no doubt,
either as to the existence of qualifying standards for legislators' pension
which the Respondents do not meet, or the 1ntent of the several state
legislatures that such standards be applied to them.

Further, we submit

that the authority within both constitutional and other legal parameters
does exist in the legislature to make such determination.

Further, when
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the difficulty of "reading out" these qualifying standards is considereo

in light of all the other pension systems--Public, Public Safety, Firem,,

and Judges'--and the consequences to the Public Employees System and th;
accrued rights of included and funded employees of all of these SysteM

are given perspective, we strongly urqe this Court to sustain the positi,
of Appe 11 ants by revers i nq the judgment of the 1ow er court and ordering
judgment for the Appellants.
Dated this

)t:!JJ.__

day of September, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Madsen
As istant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellants
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